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Abstract 
The paper deals with the problem of closing seals in coal mines. After several 
accidents in Sago, Darby and other mines in the USA the explosion destructed the seals 
completely. This raised a question of what resistance is necessary for their construction. 
I would like to express my opinion that the request of federal safety regulation to achieve 
the resistance of seal of 20 pounds per square inch, which corresponds to the European 
0,138 MPa (MegaPascal) is dangerous. If the temperature in the area before explosion is 
for example 15°C, then after the explosion it can reach up to 2 650°C. After 
recalculation the absolute temperature of mixture before and after the explosion can be 
288 K to 2 923 K. Gases then increase during explosion in volume more than 10 times. 
According to Mariott law, the original pressure of 0.1 MPa must increase 10 times as 
much, up to 1 MPa. The seals should be designed, as the prevailing opinions claim, to 
this pressure value. 
Abstrakt 
Příspěvek se zabývá problémem uzavíracích hrázi v hlubinných uhelných dolech. 
Po haváriích na Dole Sago a Darby v USA, byly výbuchem tyto hráze rozmetány. To 
vyvolalo otázku, jaký odpor je nutný k jejich dimenzování. Předem bych chtěl vyslovit 
názor, že požadavek bezpečnostních federálních předpisů v USA, aby hráze byly 
konstruovány na odpor 20 psi (tj. 0,138 MPa) je nebezpečný. Pokud je v uzavřené 
oblasti teplota například 15 °C, pak po výbuchu může dosáhnout 2 650 °C . Po přepočtu 
to je z 288 K na 2 923 K. Podle Mariottova zákona tak musí původní tlak 0,1 MPa vzrůst 
přibližně l0x, tj. na 1 MPa. A na tento tlak by měly být, podle dosavadních 
převládajících názorů, hráze dimenzovány. 
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 1 INTRODUCTION 
On 2nd January 2006 there was a methane explosion behind the seals in the 
enclosed area of Sago mine in Western Virginia. The explosion destroyed the closing 
seals and 12 miners died in the originated semi-explosive residues. On 20th May 2006 
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another explosion occurred in Darby Mine no. 1 in Harlan County, Kentucky, which 
disturbed the seals as well. This event ended up with 5 fatalities. 
In both cases, the seals were of Omega type made from reinforced concrete 
blocks by the Burrell Mining Products in New Kensington, Kansas. These seals have 
been reportedly used in the USA for 15 years, but we have no detailed information about 
their design. 
The Mine Safety and Health Administration (MSHA) allowed installation of 
these blocks without traditional kirvings. It is a method consisting in break on the 
roadway perimeter up to the undisturbed rock, which is supposed to ensure a reliable 
seal-rock contact. The approval was granted when the such-free seals withstood testing 
explosion waves of 20 psi (i.e. 0,138MPa). 
The aforesaid events and other accidents aroused a wave of emotions in the USA. 
They were reported in closer details by [1, 2, 3]. The mining industry in the USA must 
definitely be considered very advanced. Therefore, these cases involved our interest and 
we try to gather knowledge associated with them also for our practice. 
A series of experimental research studies is currently conducted in the USA to 
clarify the case. It also includes practical verifications in a testing mine. 
The researchers constructed three separate seals in Lake Lynn experimental Mine 
in Fayette County to re-enact the explosion in the Sago Mine. One seal was made of a 
cement block, the second of high-density foam similar to those that were used in Sago 
Mine and the third experimental seal was of a hybrid structure. These seals were 
subsequently exposed to an air blast wave impact of 20 psi (i.e 20 pounds per square 
inch, i.e lb/sq.in, which is approximately 138 kPa), an overpressure that we consider to 
be a hazardously low limit here. I have to underline that it is a value given the USA 
Code of Federal Regulation as the limit for defining explosion resistance of the seals. 
The seals withstood the overpressure and according to the opinion of one of the 
parties concerned, they were not disturbed by the explosion at all, whereas in Sago Mine 
they were destructed by the explosion. 
The information [2] state that this finding leads the researchers towards two 
opinions: 
Either the seals in Sago Mine were not made in sufficient quality, or the 
explosion behind the seals on 2nd January 2006 was stronger than could be expected. 
Further is was discovered that during the Sago Mine explosion a container filling 
device with a weight of 1 200 lb (≅ 544 kg) was thrown in a distance of 150 ft (  45 
m). During the experiment on 15th April 2006 similar device, which was equally 
positioned, was thrown only to a distance of 15 ft (
≅
≅  4,5 m). 
When there was another destructive explosion on 20th May 2006, Mr. David Dye, 
the then MSHA executive administrator expressed his significant concern, when the 
Omega Block seals tailed to resist the explosion for the second time. 
Recent information published by US Mining Rescue Association (USMRA) [3] 
implies that the use of the Omega Block seals is forbidden until complete investigation 
of the cases. 
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In connection with the second case on May 2006 the USMRA disclosed that the 
resistance of the seal to 20 psi is less then a half compared to the Australian regulations, 
according to which the seal should be able to resist the pressure of 50 psi. European 
regulations reportedly require the seals to withstand the pressure of 72 psi. We do not 
know from where [3| the above quoted was taken, but it is rather simplified and 
distorting. Most probably USMRA imprecisely used data from German practice. 
Opinions on the pressure wave value during explosion 
It is definitely interesting that Czech safety regulations are more stringent than the 
American ones. 
It is due to the fact that traditionally they are based on the values recommended at 
the end of the 19th century with the use of state equation, where according to the Boyle-
Mariott law the originated pressure must correspond to the change in volume of gas, 
which is the energy of explosion in consequence of the combustion residues heating. For 
the ideal mixture and heating from 288 K to 2 923 K the gases increase in volume almost 
ten times, which resulted in the opinion that the pressure originated during the explosion 
of the methane-air mixture can achieve a tenfold of the original pressure in the point of 
explosion. This does not necessarily have to be so, as claimed by the VSB professors K. 
Voralek and A. Riman in the fiftieths of last century. They were aware of the fact that in 
the mine environment there are significantly different conditions in the 1D waveguide 
dimension, given by the mine works geometry and many local resistances on one side 
ant waveguide wall roughness on the other. 
This question is tackled by [5], which can be considered one of the newer 
sources. In free areas and in the extreme case they assume turbulences forming a mixture 
with sufficient energy to shifting from deflagration to detonation. This way of flame 
expansion is associated with expansion speed exceeding the speed of sound (double to 
quintuple of the sonic speed) and maximum overpressure around 1.8 MPa. If detonation 
already occurs, the turbulence is not necessary to maintain the expansion speed. 
However, it is necessary to mention that the detonation expansion requires the burning 
part of the cloud to be homogeneously be mixed. However, as such homogeneous areas 
occur only rarely, the cloud detonations are extremely improbable. Our authors in their 
conclusions draw, apart from others, on the works of scientists in the USA. 
Whether a deflagration or detonation occurs is influenced also by the available 
initiation energy. Deflagrations of mixtures of common hydrocarbons with air require 
initiation energy of approximately 10-4 J. On the other hand, direct initiation of 
detonation of these mixtures requires initiation energy of approximately 106 J, which is a 
value comparable to energy generated by a blast charge of a condensed explosive. Direct 
initiation of detonation is therefore also very improbable in case of accident, but it is 
possible, if generated by a preceding smaller explosion. 
The air blast wave intensity is in principle expressed by two values, i.e. maximum 
pressure. which is usually identical with the pressure in front of the air blast wave ( pf, ) 
and impulse of the overpressure part of the air blast wave (I+). 
For ordinary calculations and evaluation of the air blast wave procedure 
underground we monitor, as the necessary parameters, mainly overpressure in front of 
the air blast wave ( ∆pf ) and speed of the expansion of the front of air blast wave in the 
compression range. Generally, the speed of progress of an air blast wave is proportional 
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to the air blast wave pressure and the values of these parameters decrease with increasing 
distance from the source. In real mine environment these values are different and 
considerably lower, because the mixture in the explosive system is not completely 
homogeneous and is subject to many inhibiting factors of technical nature. On top of 
that, the methods of measuring overpressure in experimental tanks, shock tubes, testing 
roadways and mines are varied, relatively imprecise and imperfect.  
Dimensioning of seals in the Czech Republic and in other countries  
For our conditions, the valid value of calculation results from the assumption of 
initiation of pressure wave with a value of 1 MPa, which is used in amended form also 
by valid mining authority decree no. 4/1994 of coll. This value of calculation defines 
requirements for design and construction of objects and devices for distribution and 
isolation of airs and closing of mine works, as amended by the decree of the Czech 
Mining Authority no. 90/2003 of Coll.. whose § 14 stipulates the following: 
Seal object explosion-resistance 
1) Explosion resistant object is designed for explosion pressure . 
The following safety coefficient values must be chosen: 
MPaPv 5,0=
a) k = 1 for an object of dam door designed for isolation of air currents inside the 
air area and for closing seal intended for closing of abandoned mine works and gobs 
without the risk of spontaneous combustion of coal; 
b) k = 2 for an object of dam door designed for isolation of the individual air 
areas and for closing seal intended for closing of abandoned mine works and gobs with 
the risk of spontaneous combustion of coal and for dam object, which is to be allowed by 
the local mining authority during the approval of mining activity. 
2) The lowest thickness of the seal L in meters is defined by the following 
formula: 
2
1
max9,0 ⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡ ⋅⋅⋅=
d
v kPbL σ      (1) 
where  
k  and  - is defined according to paragraph 1 vP
dσ   - the lowest compressive strength of the used construction 
material in MPa; 
maxb  - the largest from the dimensions of gross cross-section of the work 
(height or width) in meters. 
The equation (1) implies that for the given example of closing seals that should 
have been constructed in the case of the above accidents, according to our regulations, 1 
b coefficient should have been chosen, i.e. they should have been designed for the 
pressure of 1 MPa. In order to have the full picture of the complex issue of pressure 
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value in the moment of explosion and subsequent dynamic action (impact and backlash 
of the pressure wave), I mention findings from other countries with advanced mining.  
The main parameter in Germany is the value of explosion resistance limit, which 
is 0,5 MPa (this might be the source for the quote in the USMRA information) [3].  
Similarly to our conditions the construction of explosion-proof seals is solved in 
Slovakia and Poland (where the instructions for building seals is considerably simpler). 
The seals in Ukraine and Russia are built in so called safe distance from the seat of 
explosion, which is calculated from the estimated value of overpressure in front of the 
air blast wave in problematically specified limit of detonation wave 
MPap f 8,2=∆  
(according to A. M. Cechovskich), with estmation of exponential drop of overpressure 
on its further way through mine works. Its definition is commonly accepted in general 
equation: 
kx
fx epp
−⋅∆=∆
      (2) 
where 
xp∆   - is the overpressure in front of the air blast wave in the distance x from 
the explosion zone boundary; 
fp∆  - is the overpressure in front of the formed air blast wave on the 
explosion zone boundary; 
k   - is dimension-less coefficient of the air blast wave attenuation 
depending mainly on the resistance of mine works and many other factors and generally 
ranges from 0,001 to 0,01; 
x    - is the distance of the surveyed spot from the explosion zone 
boundary. Interesting data comes from the Emergency Preparedness and Mines Rescue 
in Australia. New South Wales, where they claim that the experimental explosions of 
coal dust brought about a result of maximum pressure of 100 psi (≅  0,69 MPa), but the 
majority of experts considers this overpressure in the underground conditions very 
improbable and the explosion-resistance sealing should probably deal with the limit 
value of 50 psi (≅ 345 kPa). The ministry for minerals and rescue work in Australian 
Queensland issued directives defining the seal resistance, which specify the limit value 
of 5 psi (  35 kPa) for use in mines, where the level of natural occurrence of flammable 
gases is not able to achieve the lower limit explosiveness under no circumstances, 50 psi 
(  345 kPa) where people stay underground and where combustible mixture can 
accumulate in an enclosed area and where there is a risk of spontaneous combustion, or 
the risk of mixture combustion, and finally 20 psi (
≅
≅
≅  138 kPa) in other cases not 
specified above. 
The technology of building seals known in Europe is not commonly used in the 
Australian mines, because their length is according to the known data hardly realizable 
in the mining conditions of the New South Wales. Despite this fact, the thickness of 
definitive seals is reported with the dimensions from 1 to 4 meters depending on the 
roadway profile and seal equipment. 
19 
The Canadian Handbook of Training in Mine Rescue and Recovery Operations 
2001 issued by MSHA, Canada describes the temporary closing seals as well as 
“barricade seals", but the values of their resistance against action of air blast waves are 
not reported. According to the figures and building instructions it is possible to assume 
that their design approximates rather the German seal parameters than the American 
ones.  
Discussion on the reliability of seals 
According to the last information [4] the standpoint of the federal institution has 
already been issued. It stipulates that the new closing seals must withstand a resistance 
of 50 psi (  345 kPa). The previous federal standard of 20 psi (≅ ≅  138 kPa) is thus 
questioned. The standpoint of the federal body holds that the Omega block seals used for 
the test explosion in the Lake Lynn Laboratory experimental mine in Fayette County, 
which was of the same construction like in the Sago mine, showed only hair-line cracks 
on the perimeter. Also the data on the explosive strength was specified, achieving the 
vale of 22.5 psi (≅  155 kPa). 
Mr. James M. Dean, who was in charge of the management of the West Virginia's 
Office of Miners Health, Safety and Training, according to [4] states that he does not 
understand, why the research specified the standard of 50 psi (≅  345 kPa). In his 
opinion this value should be higher. For the sake of completeness, Mr. James M. Dean is 
the head teacher of the mining post-graduate study program of West Virginia University 
in Morgantown. 
The discussed issue of the reliability of the closing seats has two aspects: The 
first one – the safety of crew - which results from the above cases in the American 
mines, now becomes a serious issue. Another aspect is the economics of the construction 
of these objects. If there was a possibility to reduce the seal dimensions (mainly its 
thickness) without reducing the reliability of the seal, it would result in a considerable 
cost saving. The dimensions of the seal is naturally associated with the blast wave 
pressure, therefore the specification of this value constitutes a crucial factor. It is 
interesting that this possibility was a subject of a series of important tasks. When 
assessing the problems associated with seals, not only their dimensions and used 
material characteristics are important. 
A very important factor is mainly the execution of seal and its connection with 
the adjacent rock. The integration of the entire seal structure within the undisturbed rock 
mass by means of executing sufficiently deep cutting, or the anchoring is of significant 
importance. 
The research effort should be focused also in this particular direction and should 
try to look for solutions for a reliable contact of the seal with the adjacent rock. 
Example of a seal construction in the Czech Republic 
An example of suitable seal structure, which has recently been used in the Czech 
Republic, is shown in fig. 1. It is one of the designs compliant with Czech Mining 
Authority regulation no. 4/1994 Coll. 
According to §§ 16, 17 of the regulation it makes use of a mixture of fly ash and 
water with cement with a weight ratio 4 : 1 to 1 : 1. The depth of cutting in solid rock 
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must be at least 50 cm. The material strength in simple tension after 28 days of 
solidification is decisive for the calculation of 
the seal dimensions. The "L" value (minimum thickness) is defined by the 
formula (1): 
 
Fig. 1. Example of a cement-ash seal in the roadway supported with steel arches 
 1  Front brattice stopping  6 Manhole 
 2 Back brattice stopping   7 Off-take piping 
 3 Checking piping    8 Drain piping 
 4 Float piping    9 Hitching on the 
mine work  
 5 Roof break     perimeter 
 2 CONCLUSIONS 
If I were to express my opinion and conclusion on the above issues. I would 
recommend designing the seals according to our existing legislation, which should apply 
also in countries. which are subject to other regulations. Furthermore, it would be 
purposeful to acquire means for a research task on the influence of rock-seal contact in 
terms of reliability of the seal. International cooperation would also be suitable in this 
matter. 
 3 SUMMARY 
After explosion on Sago mine No. 1 in Upshur County, West Virginia at 2nd 
January 2006 together 13 miners waned. Twelve miners died from carbon monoxide 
poisoning and one was left brain damaged after the event. The further explosion on the 
Darby mine No. 1 in Harlam County, Ky. occurred at 20. May 2006 and required 5 
victim on life. The closing seals were destroyed in the both incidents. The seals were 
constructed from Omega Block, a cement-and-fiber foam block favored by many mine 
operators because they are lighter than the traditional cement blocks used to seal 
abandoned areas of mines. The material for producing of these seals was manufactured 
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by Burrell Mining products New Kengsington Westmoreland County. These seals are in 
USA 15 years in use at least. 
The Mine Safety and Health Administration (MSHA) first approved the blocks 
for use nearly a decade ago, but more recently allowed the installation of the blocks 
without the traditional "cutting" — the practice of digging a notch into the mine wall and 
ceiling to secure the seal. 
Unhitched Omega Block walls were approved after one such wall withstood the 
minimum 20 pounds per square inch blast pressure during a test of seals meant to be 
erected during mine emergencies. Unite State Mining Rescue Association (USMRA) has 
published after second blast in the colliery this information [3]: 
The counteraction of 20 pounds per square inch (psi) is one half of requirement 
withstood according to Australian safety rules only. In Australian the requirement 
withstood of seal is 50 psi (345 kPa). The safety regulations in Europe expectant the 
resistance of seal 72 psi (517 kPa). 
I do not know from where [3] the quoted statement assumed but is somewhat 
simplified and misrepresenting. Probably it uses not correctly the data from Germany 
rules. According to our information experimental blasts of coal dust in Australian fetch 
result of maximum pressure 690 kPa (0, 69 MPa) = (100 psi). (1 psi = 0,0069MPa.). 
These events and further accidents developed in USA undulation of emotion. The more 
detailed information is in [1, 2, 3]. The mining industry in USA we must definitely 
account very mature a that is why us these cases interest and we try from themselves 
obtain piece of knowledge for our practice also. To clear up these case are provided 
series of experimentally-investigative solution. A test blast in an experimental Lake 
Lynn mine in Fayette County is one of the important. Test blast raises specter of bigger 
Sago explosion than thought. 
The test result apparently leaves researchers with two possibilities: that the seals 
were not constructed properly, or that the Jan. 2. 2006 Sago explosions were more 
powerful than investigators thought.  
During the experiment researchers had constructed three separate seals — one 
made of concrete blocks another of high-density foam blocks like those used at the Sago 
mine and a third of a hybrid construction — then hit them with a force of 20 pounds per 
square inch (138 kPa), the federal standard (Code of Federal Regulation), that mine seals 
are supposed to withstand. 
According to information briefed on the experiment at the Lake Lynn mine, near 
Fairchance: "The seals are completely intact." By contrast, the force of the methane 
explosion at Sago Mine No. 1 in Upshur County, W.Va.. destroyed the walls that were 
erected to close off an abandoned section of the mine. 
In addition, the blast hurled a nearby 1,200-pound (543 kg) filling machine of the 
storage tank 150 feet (45 m). In experimental blast, the same filling machine of the 
storage tank was similarly placed but the force moved it only about 15 feet. (4,5 m). 
Official released transcripts of testimony by Sago miners indicate that 
investigators are keenly interested in how crews built the concrete-and-fiberglass foam 
Omega block seals and whether they were installed according to specifications. 
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In a statement released later, a spokesman for the federal Mine Safety and Health 
Administration (MSHA) said the agency will be conducting additional tests for the 
investigation. 
From last information of (USMRA) [3] follows that using of seal type Omega 
block is until investigation case off limits. 
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RESUMÉ 
Po výbuchu na dole Sago c. 1 v Upshur County v Západní Virginii 2. ledna 2006 
zahynulo celkem 13 horníků. Dvanáct horníků zemřelo na otravu oxidem uhelnatým a 
jeden na mozková poranění bezprostředně po události. K. dalšímu výbuchu v dole Darby 
c. 1 v Harlam County v Kentucky došlo 20. května 2006 a vyžádal si 5 lidských obětí. 
Při obou výbuších byly zničeny uzavírací hráze. Hráze byly postaveny z cementových 
pěnových bloků typu Omega Block, kterým mnoho těžařů dává přednost, protože jsou 
lehčí, než tradiční cementové bloky používané v důlních stařinách. Materiál pro tyto 
hráze byl vyroben společností Burrell Mining products z New Kengsington 
Westmoreland County. Tyto hráze se v USA používají nejméně 15 let. Úřad Mine Safety 
and Health Administration (MSHA, což je obdoba naší Báňské Správy) poprvé schválil 
tyto bloky skoro před deseti lety, ale nověji povolil instalaci těchto bloků bez tradičního 
"záseku" - vytvoření zářezu do stěny důlního díla a jeho stropu za účelem zajištění hráze. 
Bezzásekové stěny z bloku Omega byly schváleny poté, co taková stěna odolala 
minimálnímu tlaku 20 liber na čtverečný palec při testování hrázi, které měly být 
budovány  v nouzových situacích v dole. Americká Báňská Správa Unite State Mining 
Rescue Association (USMRA) zveřejnila po druhém důlním výbuchu následující 
informaci [3]: Odpor 20 liber na čtvereční palec (psi) je pouze polovina hodnoty 
požadované australskými předpisy. Požadovaná hodnota odporu v Austrálii je 50 psi 
(345 kPa). Bezpečnostní předpisy v Evropě předpokládají odpor hráze v hodnotě 72 psi 
(517 kPa). Nevím, odkud |3| uvedené tvrzení pramení, ale je poněkud zjednodušené a 
zavádějící. Pravděpodobně nesprávně interpretuje údaje Německých norem. Podle 
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našich informací poskytly experimentální výbuchy uhelného prachu v Austrálii výsledný 
maximální tlak 690 kPa (0, 69 MPa) = (100 psi). (1 psi = 0,0069MPa.). Zmíněné 
události a další havárie vyvolaly v USA vlnu emocí. Blíže o nich informovaly [1.2.3]. 
Hornictví USA musíme rozhodně považovat za velmi vyspělé, a proto nás tyto případy 
také zaujaly a snažíme se z nich získat poznatky i pro naši praxi. K osvětlení případu je v 
USA prováděna řada experimentálně-výzkumných prací. Patří mezi ně i praktické 
ověření na zkušebním dole Lake Lynn v Fayette County. Zkušební výbuch vzbudil 
domněnku, že výbuch v dole Sago byl silnější, než se předpokládalo. Výsledek zkoušky 
vede výzkumníky ke dvěma názorům: Buď nebyly hráze na Dole Sago zhotoveny 
kvalitně, nebo byla exploze za hrázemi dne 2. ledna 2006 v dole Sago silnější, než 
výzkumníci předpokládali. Při pokusu výzkumníci zkonstruovali tři samostatné hráze. 
Jednu z cementového bloku, druhou z bloku z vysokohustotní pěny, obdobnou těm, které 
byly použity na Dole Sago a třetí pokusná hráz byla hybridní konstrukce. Potom je 
vystavili nárazu vzdušné rázové vlny (VRV) o přetlaku 20 psi (což je přibližně 138 kPa), 
což je hodnota dána v USA báňskými předpisy, které důlní hráze mají odolat. Podle 
informací získaných z pokusu v dole Lake Lynn v blízkosti Fairchance zůstaly tyto hráze 
zcela netknuty. Naproti tomu síla výbuchu metanu na dole Sago č. 1 v Upshur County v 
Zapadni Virginii zničila stěny, které byly vystaveny za účelem uzavřít opuštěnou část 
dolu. Kromě toho při výbuchu na Dole Sago došlo k odvržení plnícího zařízení 
zásobníku o hmotnosti 1 200 lb (544 kg) vzdálenosti 150 ft (45 m). Při experimentu 15. 
dubna 2006 bylo obdobně zařízení umístěno stejným způsobem, ale síla výbuchu jím 
pohnula pouze do vzdálenosti 15 ft. (4,5 m). Oficiálně zveřejněné přepisy svědectví 
horníků z dolu Sago naznačují, že vyšetřovatelé se živě zajímají o to, jak osádka hráze z 
betonových a sklolaminatových bloků Omega vystavěla a zda byly instalovány v 
souladu se specifikacemi. V následné uveřejněném prohlášení mluvčí federální Báňské 
Správy uvedl, že úřad provede dodatečné zkoušky pro účely vyšetřování. Z posledních 
informací US Mining Rescue Association (USMRA) [3] vyplývá, že používání hrází 
typu Omega Block je až do vyšetření případu zakázáno. 
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